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Alan Turing, one of the founders of computer science, once suggest-
ed that there were two paths to human-level Artificial Intelligence 
(AI)—one through emulating the more abstract abilities of the hu-
man mind, such as chess playing, the other, much closer to the spirit 
of this book, by providing a robot with “the best sense organs that 
money can buy, and then teach[ing] it to understand and speak Eng-
lish. This process could follow the normal teaching of a child” [66, 
p.460].  Turing was noncommittal about which approach would 
work best and suggested we try both.  Two-thirds of a century after 
Turing, as different AIs battle between themselves to be the world’s 
best at chess [59], it is clear that the first approach has been spectac-
ularly successful at producing some forms of machine intelligence, 
though not at emulating or approaching “general intelligence”—the 
To appear in: Cognitive Architectures, João Sequeira, Rodrigo VenturaI and Isabel Ferraira (eds).
Berlin: Springer Verlag.
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wider intellectual and cognitive capacities of our species.1 Enthusi-
asm for Turing’s second approach has therefore re-emerged and is 
continuing to grow.  
1	Beyond	the	Turing	test	
Even more famously, and in the same paper [66], Turing also sug-
gested a way of deciding whether a machine could think in the form 
of an “imitation game.” In what is now universally known as the 
“Turing test”, a judge is asked to distinguish between a human and a 
machine based on written communication alone.  In devising the 
test, Turing explicitly sought to avoid defining thinking in terms of 
unobservables, for example, operations of the mind. Instead, he ar-
gued that we should focus on behavioral phenomena, such as the 
ability to conduct a conversation that, in a human, would be recog-
nized as requiring thinking.  The design of the Turing test is intend-
ed to create an unbiased way of comparing a machine with a man or 
woman, since there are no extraneous clues, such as appearance or 
tone of voice, to reveal which is which.  Since 1991, an annual com-
petition, the Loebner prize, has sought to evaluate the ability of AIs 
to pass tests based on Turing’s proposal—a prize of $100,000 stands 
on offer to the first AI to be consistently mistaken for an adult hu-
man following an extended and open-ended conversation. 
In Ex Machina, the 2015 science fiction movie about future AI, Na-
than Bateman, the fictional inventor of Ava, a new kind of humanoid 
robot, proposes an alternative to the Turing Test, in which “the real 
test is to show you that she [Ava] is a robot; then see if you still feel 
she has consciousness.”2  What we might call the “Garland test”, af-
																																																								
1	By this, we mean the cluster of different but overlapping intellectual/cognitive faculties that 
make humans adaptive, flexible sociotechnical animals.  Howard Gardner’s [21] “multiple intel-
ligences” view provides a good guide to this broader notion of human cognition. Attempts to 
create machine intelligence of this more multi-faceted form are increasingly discussed under the 
label Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) (e.g., [22]), hence we are using the phrase “general in-
telligence” rather than Gardner’s multiple intelligences.	
2 Nathan Bateman to Caleb Smith about the humanoid robot “Ava” he has created, from the 
original movie script for Ex Machina (2015) by Alex Garland. 
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ter the writer of Ex Machina, Alex Garland,3 is arguably a tougher 
challenge than the original test devised by Turing—there is no ques-
tion of whether you are speaking to a robot or a human; the witness 
you are interrogating is clearly a machine. Yet, like Caleb Smith, the 
young programmer whom Nathan chooses to interact with his robot, 
you might feel compelled by the robot’s ability to converse and be-
have in a life-like way to view this machine as having a mind of its 
own. 
It is worth noting that Turing intended his test as a way of deciding 
whether a machine could think, and not whether a machine has con-
sciousness. Indeed, Turing writes, “I do not think these mysteries 
[about consciousness] necessarily need to be solved before we can 
answer the question with which we are concerned in this paper 
[whether a machine can think]” ([66], p. 447).  However, many 
commentators have considered the test to be about consciousness, 
for example, John Searle, in describing the Chinese Room, a thought 
experiment predicated on the Turing test, rephrases Turing’s ques-
tion “can a machine think?” as “can a machine have conscious 
thoughts?” ([57], p. 20).  The Chinese Room is intended to demon-
strate that a machine could pass the Turing test in Chinese without 
understanding Chinese. Turing might possibly have agreed.  For 
Searle, and others, thoughts have to come from conscious minds in 
order to be actual thoughts (to be “about” something), whereas for 
Turing, it was enough for a system to generate the right kind of be-
havior to be considered as thinking; consciousness was something 
else. 
Other forms of Turing test have also been proposed by Steven Har-
nad [23, 24], who has suggested a hierarchy of Turing tests: Level 
T1 is a narrow AI, for instance, one that can prove mathematical 
theorems or is exceptional at chess.  T2, the original test, demon-
strates what Harnad calls “pen-pal” level indistinguishability by em-
ulating human linguistic capacity.  T3, the “total Turing test”, re-
quires that the robot is capable of emulating human language and 
action, but need not be made of biological stuff or otherwise con-
strained to match a particular internal structure. For Harnad, T3 is 
																																																								
3 The suggestion that we call this the Garland test has also been made by Murray Shanahan, one 
of the scientific advisors on Ex Machina. 
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the level at which we judge other people, the point at which symbol-
ic computation becomes “grounded” in the external world, and 
therefore the correct level at which to judge whether a machine has 
conscious thoughts.4 Harnad also describes, but rejects as too strin-
gent, a level T4—detailed biological indistinguishability—as might 
be required by some anti-functionalist stances. 
One of the more intriguing ideas in Ex Machina is that we are left 
unsure, at the end, as to whether the robot, Ava, has a mind similar 
to ours or whether it is, instead, an alien and devious AI that is able 
to emulate and deceive humans when this serves its purposes.  Does 
this ending suggest a challenge to Harnad’s proposal for a T3 Turing 
test or, indeed, for the Garland test (which is a variant of that test)?   
Harnad [24] admits that the T3 test is under-constrained in emulat-
ing how people think, but like Turing, he is comfortable with that; 
for Harnad, succeeding in the T3 test is evidence enough of ground-
ed (and conscious) thoughts.  However, what if we want to get clos-
er to understanding the mind, or to build a machine that actually 
does think like a human?  The evidence from Chess and Go is that 
machines can exceed human experts at these intellectual challenges 
without matching the way in which people play either game.  Simi-
larly, T3 equivalence could give us grounded symbols, but without 
further resolving how human minds work.  
But perhaps we can get closer to human general intelligence without 
going all the way to T4 equivalence. Specifically, suppose we add 
the constraint of having a human-like cognitive architecture in addi-
tion to matching human symbolic and robotic capacity.  If we can 
match both the behavior and the architecture of mind, then there is a 
greater likelihood that our AI will not only act like us but also think 
like us.  Following the scheme of Harnad’s test hierarchy, we might 
call this level T3.5. 
																																																								
4 It has been suggested that Harnad’s T2 level cannot be achieved without first building T3 to 
achieve symbol-grounding [25].  Going directly to T2 is nevertheless a theoretical possibility, 
even if it might prove impossible to achieve without a contribution from robotics. 
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2	Robotics	as	synthetic	psychology	
Based on this line of reasoning, I have, for the past seven years, been 
involved in various projects concerned with the development of as-
pects of general intelligence for humanoid robots. This work builds 
on the above premise that we can seek to create an artificial mind 
that is similar to our own by emulating human linguistic and robotic 
capacity and by employing a cognitive architecture that has been re-
verse-engineered from findings in psychology and neuroscience.  
The hope is that we can make significant progress without having to 
concern ourselves with all of the T4-level detail.  The long-term goal 
is to build a machine that can pass the Garland test whilst being suf-
ficiently biomimetic in design that we can credibly argue that its 
“mental states” are analogous to human mental states in an interest-
ing way.  
 
This goal can also be seen as belonging to the sub-discipline of syn-
thetic psychology, an enterprise within the cognitive sciences named 
after Valentino Braitenberg’s inspirational book Vehicles: Experi-
ments in Synthetic Psychology [74], which advocates that we build 
artificial creatures as a path to understanding the brains and behavior 
of biological organisms. This “understanding through building” ap-
proach also forms a core principle of the emerging field of Living 
Machines [47].5 Within robotics, there is a growing group of re-
searchers interested in this challenge, indeed, when we add in devel-
opmental constraints, this approach to reverse-engineering the hu-
man converges within the emerging field of developmental robotics 
(e.g., [13, 34]). 
 
So, what should the ambition of a synthetic psychologist be in build-
ing a human-like machine?  For many philosophers and cognitive 
scientists, even some roboticists, the Holy Grail is to understand and 
recreate human consciousness. While this ambition is attractive, it 
																																																								
5	This idea also follows in the footsteps of many others. For example, the eighteenth century Ne-
apolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico, who wrote “verum et factum reciprocantur seu conver-
tuntur [the true is precisely what is made]”, and the 20
th
 century physicist Richard Feynman, 
whose office blackboard on the day he died held the message, “what I cannot create I do not un-
derstand”.  	
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suffers from two serious drawbacks.  First, the difficulty of deciding 
what consciousness is, and second, the challenge of measuring sub-
jective first-person phenomena using a third-person approach (the 
tools of science).6 For this reason, we have chosen not to make con-
sciousness a target of our synthetic psychology research, preferring 
instead a (hopefully) more tangible phenomenon—to construct a ro-
bot with a “sense of self” [48]. Perhaps we will find that we cannot 
completely disentangle self from consciousness, but even so, by un-
derstanding the broader nature of self, we may be able to see more 
clearly what, if anything, is still left to explain about first-person ex-
perience.  
3	Defining	and	deconstructing	the	self	
Some might baulk at the thought of trying to synthesize the self 
without directly addressing consciousness, others, following David 
Hume [28], may consider that there is little to be assembled in a syn-
thetic self beyond a stream of perceptions.  But there is an interest-
ing third way.   For instance, writers such as the psychologists Susan 
Blakemore [9] and Bruce Hood [27], the cognitive scientist Douglas 
Hofstadter [75], the architect Chris Abel [1] and the philosopher 
Thomas Metzinger [37] have argued that the self as we convention-
ally imagine it is an illusion, but that, nevertheless, there is some-
thing there to be understood. For Blakemore, it is a complex of 
memes, for Hood, an internal simulation, for Hofstadter, a “strange 
loop”, for Abel, a “field of being” that can extend outside the body7, 
																																																								
6 There are multiple measures of so-called “correlates of consciousness”, Giulio Tononi’s Φ 
[63], a measure of information integration, being one of the better-known ones.  The problem is 
that there is no way to be sure that an organism or machine that scores highly on any such meas-
ure is actually experiencing consciousness.  This is known as the “other minds” problem in phi-
losophy. For Turing [66], this was part of the reason to devise a behavioral test for the existence 
of machine thought and to leave the challenge of consciousness to others.  
7	Abel’s “field of being” view stems from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s [36] phenomenology and 
his insistence on the centrality of the experience of the body.  Studies in cognitive neuroscience, 
such as those of the “rubber hand” illusion (see [10]), support Merleau-Ponty’s proposal that the 
sense of the body/self can extend into objects and the world. With virtual reality systems and 
telepresence robots, it is now possible to experimentally manipulate the sense of a virtual body, 
or of a physically remote robot body, and the associated feelings of immersion or “presence”, 
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and for Metzinger, a meta-representation (amongst other things). 
Thus, while for Blakemore, the self is a construct, for Hood, Hof-
stadter, Abel and Metzinger, the self is also a process, or set of pro-
cesses, some of which may be representational and reflective, that 
arise in the brain and body. The proposal we are seeking to investi-
gate is similar: that the sense of self can be emulated by a set of de-
finable and buildable processes that can be situated in some suitably 
configured robot.   
The notion that self is a process suggests that it can come and go, for 
instance, when the relevant processes are suspended during sleep,8 
perhaps even with the switch from an inward to an outward focus of 
attention.  This idea of the self as a transient thing has also been put 
forward by the philosopher Galen Strawson, who has proposed “that 
many mental selves exist, one at a time and one after another, like 
pearls on a string” ([60], p. 424).  This poetic metaphor asserts a 
number of things. First, that the self is not continuous, immutable, 
and immortal (as Descartes and many others have imagined, and as 
Hume and others have questioned), and second, that “selves” are 
nevertheless “things” worthy of study, and perhaps capable of emu-
lation.  
What we particularly like about Strawson’s approach is that he pro-
vides some helpful suggestions as to how we might proceed with the 
study of self, highlighting five questions ([60], p. 406): 
1.! The phenomenological question—what is the nature of the 
sense of the self? 
2.! The local phenomenological question—what is the nature of 
the human sense of the self? 
3.! The general phenomenological question—are there other 
possibilities, when it comes to a sense of the self, e.g., can we 
describe the minimal case? 
4.! The conditions question—what are the grounds or precondi-
tions of possession of a sense of the self? 
																																																																																																																															
demonstrating that “my body is wherever there is something to be done” (Merleau-Ponty, [36] p. 
291) and providing new ways to test hypotheses about the self.	
8	This was proposed by David Hume [28], for whom, if the stream of perceptions is turned off, 
as happens in sleep, the self ceases to exist, and by John Locke [33], for whom self was a mani-
festation of consciousness, which, in turn, requires an awake mind. Some elements of Locke’s 
view of self, which saw identity as arising from learning and memory, are close to the ideas of 
the extended and narrative selves discussed in this chapter.				
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5.! The factual (metaphysical) question—is there (could there 
be) such a thing as the self? 
Questions 1 and 2 are psychological in nature, and we think that we 
can make progress on these through empirical exploration9 of the 
facets of self and their variability across the population, taking into 
account, in particular, developmental and neurological differences.  
Indeed, a wealth of literature already exists on these topics going 
back to the earliest days of psychological investigation, some of 
which is discussed in brief below.   
Question 3 might direct us to the panoply of animal life as an inter-
esting place to look for the presence of other kinds of self (and pend-
ing the discovery of any extraterrestrial selves).  Comparative cogni-
tion offers many interesting insights, as well as proposals for how 
we might test for similar facets of self across species.  However, 
with robotics, we also have the possibility of building new kinds of 
self, including candidate minimal selves, for which we might adopt 
some of the cross-species yardsticks identified by comparative stud-
ies.   
Question 4 speaks to another kind of enquiry, namely as to whether 
there are any necessary conditions restricting the possibility of an 
entity possessing a self.  One requirement we might posit is a body-
world boundary and the ability to sense and maintain the internal mi-
lieu, while another might be the possession of a particular kind of 
cognitive architecture in which there are processes that have the ca-
pacity to monitor and predict other internal processes.  These ideas 
will be discussed further below. 
Finally, question 5 seems to be largely philosophical, however, we 
think that progress could also be made via a synthetic approach.  
Specifically, once we have built a robot that exhibits some relevant 
phenomena of self, we can ask whether a particular conception of 
self, for instance, Strawson’s string of pearls, is useful or not.10  In-
																																																								
9We should admit here that Strawson intends the more restricted philosophical sense of phenom-
enology as a form of systematic reflection on the structure of experience. We prefer to interpret 
the challenge of describing the nature of self from a more empirical perspective as phenomena 
associated with self that could be accessible to methods in psychology and cognitive neurosci-
ence. 
10	Note that, for a theory or concept of self to be useful, we would not consider that the self has 
to be emergent in a strong sense (that is, not reducible to lower level phenomena), but rather it 
has to serve a useful explanatory function in our psychological theory. In other words, the con-
9	
deed, we will have an instantiation of a specific theory of self as a 
machine, whose inner workings will be far more accessible than 
those of a human mind (see [38]). Such a robot should provide an 
insightful tool for advancing both the philosophical and scientific 
understanding of the phenomenon of self-hood.  
As we peruse Strawson’s questions, we think it becomes evident that 
synthetic psychology could have a lot to say. For instance, on the 
question of the constitutive conditions, we can build synthetic sys-
tems that match the proposed requirements, then apply our phenom-
enological and Garland tests: Does it behave as though it has a self? 
Do others see it as having a self? We can also make progress on this 
question of the minimal form of the target phenomenon—what is the 
simplest robot that could qualify for self-hood?  Let’s build it and 
study it. On the issue of architecture, we can seek to identify a de-
composition of the systems underlying the human self that, when 
suitably replicated in a robot, gives rise to self-like phenomena; this 
seems to us to be a tractable, if ambitious, challenge.   
Note that if selves are transient, as Strawson and others have pro-
posed, we do still need to explain why the experience of self is one 
of continuity—that you feel you are the same self yesterday, today, 
tomorrow.  Here, we can appeal to the continuity of the body (and 
the localization of the self within the body) as providing much of the 
necessary continuity. We can also look to episodic memory and im-
agination as allowing the instantaneous self to roam in time, recol-
lecting itself as it once was and imagining itself as it might yet be, 
thus creating an experience of self that can step outside the present 
and conceive of itself as enduring. Finally, we can consider semantic 
memory and narrative as providing the basis for a stable self-concept 
(beliefs and stories about the self). These ideas can also be investi-
gated in our robotic models. 
																																																																																																																															
cept of self as explicated and realized in machine form should help us to provide useful accounts 
of human (or machine) cognition and behavior. See Verschure and Prescott [72] for a discussion 
of theory building and the role of synthetic approaches in the sciences of mind and brain.	
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4	A	“systems”	view	of	self	
The plan to create a synthetic robot self becomes more plausible if 
we can find good evidence for a “systems” view of self in psycholo-
gy and cognitive neuroscience.  If this human “self-system” is at 
least weakly modular,11 then we can proceed by building the neces-
sary components, then integrating them with each other and within 
our robot control architecture, gradually approaching a model of the 
complete self.   
The psychological literature related to the self is vast, and we will 
not seek to summarize it here.  One starting point is the often cited 
proposal made by the cognitive psychologist Ulrich Neisser [40, 41], 
who suggested five different kinds of self-knowledge: 
“The ecological self is the individual situated in and acting upon the 
immediate physical environment. […]. The interpersonal self is the 
individual, engaged in social interaction with another person. […]. 
The conceptual self, or self-concept, is a person's mental representa-
tion of his/her own (more or less permanent) characteristics. […] 
The temporally extended self is the individual's own life-story as 
he/she knows it, remembers it, tells it, projects it into the future. The 
private self appears when the child comes to understand and value 
the privacy of conscious experience […]”  ([41], pp. 18-19, our 
italics). Table 1 builds on Neisser’s five-way split, conceiving of 
each of these as a sub-system of the self and relating each to some 
psychological phenomena that can provide benchmarks for the ex-
istence of that aspect of self in a person or robot. We have also fol-
lowed Shaun Gallagher [20], Marc Jeannerod [30] and others by 
adding agency—the agential self.  The systems view asserts that 
some sense of self can emerge in the absence of some of these com-
ponents and that some aspects of self, perhaps particularly the pri-
vate self, could emerge from the interaction of these components 
without being explicitly designed, i.e., the sum is more than its parts. 
																																																								
11	Modularity is itself a topic that is widely debated within the cognitive sciences. Again, we 
consider that the synthetic approach can help answer some of the longstanding questions about 
how distributed vs. modular human minds/brains are.  Our view is that the distributed nature of 
the brain can be over-stated.  The brain is a layered architecture [49], and as such, there is signif-
icant replication of function and some redundancy across these layers, however, there is also lo-




Phenomena of self Component of self 
Sensing the body 
Distinguishing yourself from the world 
Having a point-of-view 
Actively seeking sensory information 
 
Ecological 
Having emotions, drives and motiva-
tions 
Selecting actions that generate integrat-
ed behavior 
Knowing what events you have caused 




Having awareness of where you are 
Having awareness of a personal past 
and future 
Self-recognition (e.g., in a mirror) 




Learning by imitation 
Sharing attention 
Seeing others as selves 




Having beliefs about who you are (a 
self-concept) 
Having personal goals  




Having a feeling of being something 
Having a unitary stream of conscious-
ness 
Having a sense of choice 
Having a feeling of being the same 













There is evidence to support this “systems” view of self from devel-
opmental psychology, neuroscience, and comparative psychology, 
which we will briefly review next.  
From the study of human development, it is clear that very young in-
fants have a sense of their ecological selves, for example, having a 
self-other distinction. This may emerge through exploration of the 
body in the womb. The fetus explores and discovers its body 
through “motor babbling”; it also touches itself, and the experience 
of skin-on-own-skin, or “double touch”, is different from the experi-
ence of touching parts of the mother [52]. These activities allow the 
unborn child to learn the extension and limits of its own body.  The 
emerging ability to control its own body, and to distinguish when a 
sensory event was caused by its own action, can also provide the 
newborn with some pre-reflective sense of agency (along the lines 
proposed by Jeannerod [30]). Agency in older children is often stud-
ied in the context of executive function and self-regulation, for ex-
ample, the ability to withhold actions, show cognitive flexibility, or 
control emotional expression; these aspects of agency show multiple 
phases of development through infancy and the pre-school years [7, 
73]. Infantile amnesia, which lasts until we are around two years of 
age [31],  implies that the infant lives in the here and now, lacking a 
strong sense of its extension in time. The mirror test—recognizing 
that it is you in a mirror, not another child—is another milestone for 
the two-year-old [2, 4] that may indicate the beginnings of a reflec-
tive self-model.  The newborn is a social creature, adapted to bond 
rapidly with its caregivers, yet significant changes occur in its capac-
ity for sociality in the first year, including the emergence of shared 
attention, social referencing (looking to adults to understand the 
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meanings of events), imitation, and wariness of strangers [42]. It is 
not until a child is around three years of age that it has “theory of 
mind”—the ability to conceive of another’s point-of-view as differ-
ent from its own [16]. The emergence of this interpersonal self, 
which is able to interpret the actions and intentions of others, likely 
builds on capacities of the ecological self to represent and reason 
about the child’s own body.  Finally, the conceptual self may emerge 
from the extended self, through consolidation of episodic memories 
into semantics—knowledge of the self and the world—and with help 
from the growing capacity to manipulate concepts and summarize 
events using language. Prior to the school years, children struggle to 
assemble coherent descriptions of past episodes [6], but as we grow 
older, we get more practiced at translating life events into story 
form, with the most important ones being rehearsed and consolidat-
ed to become stable chapters in the emerging self-narrative.  
In the neurosciences, there is evidence from the study of neurodiver-
sity and brain damage that also supports the decomposition of the 
self into component parts. Many conditions can impact on the sense 
of the ecological self: a disturbed body model can generate sensory 
neglect [68], or the sense that a part of your body does not belong to 
you (see [10]). Disorders of the hypothalamus, the basal ganglia, 
limbic system and prefrontal cortex can disrupt motivation, action 
integration and the experience of agency [29, 30, 43]. Damage to ar-
eas such as the temporal lobe, particularly the hippocampal system, 
can cause loss of the sense of place, or of the ability to think about 
the past or future, whilst sparing the core sense of the self in the here 
and now [65].12 Activity in the “default mode” network of cortical 
sub-systems is also recognized as a critical substrate for the human 
capacity for “mental time travel” [56].  A well-known example of an 
altered social self occurs in people with autism, a condition that par-
																																																								
12	Endel Tulving’s patient N.N. exemplifies this point [65]. A traffic accident caused N.N. to 
experience profound retrograde and anterograde amnesia, nevertheless he could still talk about 
himself, his experience, his preferences, and so on; he had intact short-term memory and could 
describe time and events in general terms. He could talk about consciousness, which he de-
scribed as “being aware of who we are and what we are and where we are” ([65], p. 4).  When 
asked to imagine what he might do tomorrow, however, his mind drew a blank, which he de-
scribed as being “like swimming in the middle of a lake. There’s nothing there to do hold you up 
or do anything with” ([65], p. 4). Like other patients with amnesia, N.N. could be described as 
“marooned in the present” [32] or as having a self that has lost much of its “temporal thickness” 
[19].	
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ticularly impacts on the ability to understand others as social actors 
[5], whilst leaving intact other aspects of self (however, see [67]). 
The phenomenon of multiple personality disorder (e.g., [58]) shows 
the possibility that the self can assemble itself into one identity at 
one time, and into a very different one a few minutes later, with no 
shared consciousness or memory. This speaks to the constructed na-
ture of the self and to its dynamical character as well.  Specifically, 
if we think of identity as a stable attractor for the self system, then, 
in the unusual case of multiple personalities, the system is bi- or 
multi-stable and able to flip between different internally coherent, 
but mutually inconsistent, conceptions of self. 
Comparative psychology also demonstrates variety in the nature of 
self (if we accept that animals can have selves).  A self-other distinc-
tion, along with an ability to recognize the consequences of your ac-
tions, and hence some form of minimal self, may be shared by all bi-
lateral multi-celled animals (see below). On the other hand, the 
capacity to conceive of the self as extending into the future and the 
past is far less universal and may only be well-developed in a lim-
ited number of animal groups, including some of the larger-brained 
mammals and birds [61]. The ability to voluntarily search in autobi-
ographical memory for traces of particular events may be specific to 
humans having evolved in early homo lineages [17]. Evidence of a 
reflective self-model, as demonstrated by the mirror test, has also 
been shown in only a limited number of species, including great 
apes, dolphins, orca whales, elephants, and one species of bird (Eur-
asian magpies) [51]. The presence of an interpersonal self that has 
theory of mind, which has been extensively investigated only in 
primates, may also be confined to animals that have an expanded 
neocortex [64]. 
6	A	minimal	robotic	self?	
As noted earlier, one of the questions we would like to address 
through the synthetic approach concerns the possibility of a minimal 
self.  Shaun Gallagher [20] reviews a number of proposals for mini-
mal selves, identifying two key aspects, body ownership and agency, 
similar to the ecological and agential sub-systems noted in Table 1.  
15	
He suggests, following Bermúdez [8], that the sense of self can be 
non-conceptual, pre-reflective, confined to the present, and a transi-
ent entity like one of Strawson’s pearls.  
Jan Tani [62] has sought to create such a transient self for a mobile 
robot through a simple layered control system consisting of a per-
ception module, an association module, and a prediction module. 
The robot was tasked with following a wall whilst searching for col-
ored landmarks; the actions of the robot consist of steering by con-
trolling left and right wheel-speeds and choosing whether to allocate 
visual attention to wall-following or to landmark searching.  The ro-
bot monitors the reliability of its own predictions and uses this to ar-
bitrate between control by the “bottom-up” sensory module and that 
by the “top-down” prediction module.  Tani proposes that a form of 
self emerges when the predictions of the top-down module diverge 
from those of the sensory module, resulting in a period of dynamic 
instability, and that this “self” disappears when the prediction and 
sensory modules transition to a period of coherence. 
Tani draws analogies to mammalian brain systems, however, the 
simple control system that he describes could be compared to much 
simpler nervous systems, for example, the nerve nets of some jelly-
fish can be conceived of as forming layered architectures in which 
distinct distributed networks compete for control of the motor sys-
tem [50]. The earliest bilaterian animals, whose existence in the Pre-
cambrian era more than 540 million years ago is evidenced by fos-
sils of their foraging trails, likely possessed internal organs, tentacle-
like appendages, multiple sensors, and a nervous system that includ-
ed a central ganglion, sometimes referred to as the “archaic brain” 
(see [50] for review). Modern day worms, including animals as sim-
ple as C. Elegans, have shown associative learning and the ability to 
use sensory signals to predict aversive chemicals and the presence of 
absence of food [3].  If monitoring the divergence between internal 
expectations about the world and sensory experience can give rise to 
a self, then perhaps minimal selves were present in some of the first 
mobile multicellular animals.  
Tani’s model is based on the hypothesis that the self requires a pro-
cess that has an internal state that can evolve according to its own 
dynamics without being too tightly coupled to the world—the pre-
dictions of the system can drift from accurately forecasting the 
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world, and at this point, the robot obtains a self.  However, all ani-
mals with nervous systems interoceptively sense their bodies at the 
same time as they exteroceptively sense the environment; the pat-
terns of sensory signals from the internal milieu, which will have 
very different dynamics from those of the sensed external world, 
thus already provide a basis for pre-reflectively distinguishing self 
from other. 
7	A	biomimetic	cognitive	architecture	for	the	robot	self	
In Sheffield, we have been building and testing brain-based robots, 
as experiments in synthetic psychology, since the mid-1990s, devis-
ing a number of models of brain architecture based on principles of 
layered control [49] and inspired by neurobehavioral studies of ac-
tive sensing in rodents [48].  For the past seven years, together with 
European colleagues, we have also been incorporating models of 
key brain systems into a brain-inspired control architecture for the 
iCub robot (Figure 1) called distributed adaptive control (DAC), de-








DAC is a high-level conceptual scheme that seeks to capture the 
cognitive architecture of the human brain and consists of four tightly 
coupled layers: soma, reactive, adaptive and contextual.  Across the-
se layers, there are three functional columns of organization: The 
first comprises the sensory, perceptual and memory sub-systems re-
lating to the world, the second the interoceptive, motivational and 
memory sub-systems related to the self, and the third sub-systems 
that operate on the world through action. These DAC sub-systems 
do not directly map on to specific neural substrates, however, signif-
icant progress has been made relating parts of the DAC architecture 
to different brain sub-systems and circuits [47, 69]. Recent efforts to 
create a multi-faceted robot sense of self for iCub, using DAC, are 
detailed in [39]; here, we briefly summarize the architecture and 
some of the self-related capabilities it enables. 
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In DAC, the somatic layer corresponds to the body and provides ac-
cess to exteroceptive, interoceptive, and proprioceptive signals from, 
respectively, the environment, internal processes and regulatory sys-
tems, and the motor/effector system. The reactive layer instantiates 
multiple fast, reflexive sensorimotor loops that support behaviors 
linked to needs; these loops are stability-seeking processes that re-
duce drives through action. The adaptive layer extends the sen-
sorimotor loops of the reactive layer to make use of learned contin-
gencies and to allow actions to be associated with states of the 
world. The adaptive layer is thus part of the solution to the symbol 
grounding problem, through the acquisition of mappings from inter-
nal states to world states. Whereas the adaptive layer operates large-
ly in the here and now, the contextual layer adds the ability to store 
and retrieve short- and long-term memories, linked to goal achieve-
ment, that can act as action plans to be triggered by sensory contexts 
and that can be chained to create behavior sequences. This layer also 
includes predictive systems that can forecast the future state of the 
world based on action plans. Contextual layer systems can also en-
code and retrieve event memories and form abstract representations 
of events in narrative form that allow the robot to summarize and 
communicate about past episodes. 
The DAC architecture generates aspects of the ecological self 
through interoceptive processes that maintain a model of the robot’s 
physical parts and the geometry of its current body pose, and extero-
ceptive processes that monitor the robot’s immediate surroundings. 
For example, using somatotopic maps modelled on human primary 
sensory cortex, and techniques such as self touch, Giorgio Metta, 
Matej Hoffmann and colleagues have developed methods that allow 
the iCub to learn its own body model [26], and recalibrate its 
knowledge of its own geometry [54]. Additionally, by combining vi-
sion with tactile sensing and with proprioception, iCub is able to de-
velop a sense of peripersonal space that allows it to predict contacts 
with objects before they happen [53]. This foundation provides the 
beginnings of an ecological self that can be used to distinguish self 
from other, plan safe movement trajectories, and reason about the 
capacity for movement of others (see more below).  
In Sheffield, we have been working to develop an episodic or event 
memory system for the DAC adaptive and contextual layers that can 
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contribute to a robotic extended self.  Our hypothesis is that event 
memory can be usefully considered as an attractor network operating 
in a latent (hidden) variable space whose dimensions encode salient 
characteristics of the physical and social world in a highly com-
pressed fashion [18]. According to this view, the operation of per-
ceptual systems in the adaptive and contextual layers can be analo-
gized to learning processes that identify psychologically meaningful 
latent variable descriptions. Instantaneous memories then correspond 
to points in this latent variable space and event memories to trajecto-
ries through this space.  A single latent feature space can be used to 
represent memories across multiple sensory modalities thus 
providing sensory fusion. This enhances compression as coupled 
signals among heterogenous modalities are discovered and repre-
sented in a common set of latent variables. This can also be thought 
of as concept discovery—the identification of underlying invariance 
in patterns of multi-modal sensory flow. The current implementa-
tion, illustrated in Figure 2, demonstrates effective memory for-
mation and retrieval of human faces, actions, voices and emotions 
[12, 14, 35]. Due to its generative nature, and ability to interpolate, 
the system can also generate fantasy memories from parts of the la-
tent variable space that have not been populated by real data. This 
leads to the possibility of imagining future events [14].  The ability 
of the system to reconstruct the sensory pattern associated with a re-
called memory [11], retrieved using a verbal cue, suggests that event 






















Neuroscience research suggests that an effective approach to build-
ing the interpersonal self could be to use the robot’s own internal 
body models—the ones that underlie the ecological self—to simu-
late the pose and actions of others. With iCub, we have developed 
DAC processes that allow the robot to represent the state of the 
world from a different point-of-view (see [39]), allowing iCub to 
reason about what a human partner can see and helping the robot to 
resolve perceptual ambiguities and improve communication.  One 
important human ability that benefits from the interpersonal self is 
the capacity to learn by imitation. Yiannis Demiris and co-workers 
have demonstrated that you can build up from motor babbling to a 
hierarchical learning system that uses forward models, inspired by 
studies of the primate “mirror neuron” system, to learn by imitation 
[15].  This system has been used with the iCub to allow it to rapidly 
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acquire new hand gestures and sequences of actions involved in 
playing games or solving puzzles.  
As shown in Figure 2, a key part of the broader system in which our 
synthetic event memory operates is the component related to narra-
tive reasoning, this is one of the sub-systems that generate the con-
ceptual self.  Peter Dominey and colleagues (see, e.g., [4]) have been 
working to model autobiographical memory and narrative construc-
tion using an acquired grammar, together with compact and struc-
tured representations of iCub’s interaction history.  Using this narra-
tive system, iCub can recall and discuss past events, including some 
of its past interactions with people, from a first-person perspective.	 
One longer-term goal is to integrate this narrative construction pro-
cess with the event memory system developed in Sheffield such that 
linguistic descriptions can be abstracted from representations of 
events as attractor patterns in latent variable space. Using the gen-
erative capabilities of the event memory, narratives could also be 
played out, and “grounded”, via reconstruction as simulated sensory 
scenes.  
In sum, we have made a start in instantiating some of the different 
aspects of the sense of self in our iCub robot. The lower layers of the 
DAC architecture integrate internal and external sensory signals so 
as to regulate self-correcting control loops based on drives.  These 
sub-systems meet many of the criteria for a minimal self.  The upper 
layers encode representations of past events that can be used to rea-
son about the future and about social others, creating some of the el-
ements that we are seeking for the extended and interpersonal selves. 
Finally, the narrative system provides the seeds for a self-concept 
and life story. We have not sought to build a private self directly, ra-
ther, the plan is to create the rest of the architecture and then see if 
an impression of the experiential self can emerge from within in our 
version of the Garland test.  Indeed, on a good day, when all of the 
sub-systems are working properly, interacting with the iCub can 
begin to feel as though “someone is home”, even for the people who 
have helped to develop the robot’s control systems and understand 
how they operate. On the other hand, it also feels as if we have only 
just set out on the journey of deconstructing the human self and rec-
reating it in a machine. Indeed, as Turing wrote at the end of Com-
puting Machinery and Intelligence— “we can only see a short dis-
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tance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be done” 
([66], p. 460). 
8	Conclusion	
This chapter has argued that the human self is brought into being by 
the activity of a set of self-processes instantiated by the brain and 
body and has proposed that we can synthesize an artificial self by 
developing equivalent sub-systems within an integrated biomimetic 
cognitive architecture for a humanoid robot.  While the various self-
processes may be transient, the continuity provided by a physical 
body, in a human or robot, can provide the basis for the experience 
of a continued self. This suggests a key role for embodiment, first in 
establishing a boundary between the self and the world, and second 
in providing a predictable and consistent setting in which the self 
awakens to find itself.  Beyond this, an extended self, generated by 
the capacity to remember and imagine, allows the self to escape 
from the island of the present, while abstraction and narrative allow 
it to construct and maintain a coherent set of beliefs and stories 
about itself. To evaluate the possibility of a robot self, we have sug-
gested a version of the Turing test, extended to include physical em-
bodiment and human-like cognitive architecture, that asks whether 
people who encounter a robot with synthetic self-processes consider 
that they have met an entity with a self.  
We began the chapter by motivating this work in the context of the 
criteria for recognizing other minds, and the challenge of bench-
marking artificial general intelligence against human. We have con-
cluded by summarizing some initial efforts to create a sense of self 
for the iCub humanoid robot that has ecological, temporally-
extended, interpersonal and narrative components set within a multi-
layered model of mind. 
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